America in the Age of Soviet Power

Cohen’s America in the Age of Soviet Power, is a fascinated reading describing the period in which the Cold War occurred and that the United States became a hegemonic world leader. The Americans were able to fully exercise its messianic destine as the propagator of its values in the quest for achieving of a prosperous and peaceful world. Democracy, freedom, free trade and collective defense were principles in which the new world order was going to be constructed. Peace and stability would reign only if these ideals were implemented to all corners of the world. In his book, Cohen describes the American trajectory as it fought to establish its expected role in dominating the international arena demonstrating how US leadership played foreign policies to first and foremost envisioning its own interest from the birth of the Soviet conflict after the end of World War II to the Reagan Administration, shaping the world we live today.
His book begins by explaining how both the US and the USSR fought together to win the battle against the Axis Power and how they became victorious. The war brought destruction among European countries and the US (with all the financial benefits from the war) and Soviet Union emerged as dominant forces of the world politics. The war brought to end European colonialism in the Third Word and many new nations came to exist in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Cohen states regarding the relationship between the Soviet Union and United States during the years after the end of the war to the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 “Each nation (US and USSR) pursued its vision of world order, exploring the possibilities of cooperation in achieving its goals, and testing the limits of the other’s tolerance in pursuit of unshared goals” (P. 1). Both countries understood that with the collapse of Germany, Japan and the decadence of British power, there were new grounds for increasing its influence and interests. The Roosevelt Administration was sure that the moment had came for America to fulfill its messianic mission in creating a world order based on its idealism that would guarantee not only prosperity, peace and stability abroad but also be advantageous to the interest of the United States. Germany and Japan would be prevented to gain power and never again be able to commit the atrocities against the world. The Bretton Woods conference was initiated to establish the post-war monetary system, a liberal international economic order. The Soviets did not fully participated but understood the importance of not creating tensions between them and the west. The results were the creation of IMF and the World Bank aiding the expansion of international trade. The system would assure the long term interest of the US. When Truman assumed presidency after Roosevelt’s death, he understood that Soviet-American cooperation was essential to the new world order. The problem over Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe needed to be addressed maintaining the sense of cooperation left from the Roosevelt-Stalin’s talks. However, Truman could not ignore American’s principles of self-determination and he got tougher with the Soviet leadership that fearfully perceived that American policy had changed. Other problems emerged in the relationship of the two nations right after the war ended. Soviets were eager to receive reconstruction loans that no one in the US was willing to give. Also, there were disagreements on the amount of German’s reparations and the way the US dominated the administration and occupation of Japan. The American public was horrified by the brutal behavior of the Soviets in Eastern Europe. Cohen states “Soviet suspicions angered Americans. American arrogance, bordering on contempt, infuriated the Soviets (P. 25). By 1946, Truman realized that cooperation with the Soviets was not going to be easily achieved and both countries were feeling the threat initiating a “security dilemma” that encouraged both countries to enhance both national security. Other nations also, trying to gain influence in the America, exacerbated this idea of the Soviet threat in order to gain reconstruction aid and military assistance. On the Soviet side, American interest in the reconstruction of Germany was seeing as a betrayal and threat to its security since the latter had invaded the Soviet Union twice and causing great damage and harm. Another area of American concern was the Middle East where Soviets had not yet withdrew its troops from Iran as the West did after the end of the War. As American understood the threat of losing vital Western Europe to communism, the Truman administration launched the “containment” policy. A civil war crises (little known of Soviet involvement) in Greece erupted. As Cohen explains “Their ultimate concern was not Greece, but rather the assertion of American power in the Middle East. The region was of enormous strategic importance in the event of war with the Soviet Union and its oil reserves could not be allowed to fall into unfriendly hands (P. 37). After an address to Congress requesting for aid for Greece and Turkey, the Truman Doctrine was outlined further exacerbating the Soviet threat as a serious challenge to national security to the American public. As Cohen explained in the weak-government paradigm “To focus congressional attention on foreign affairs, and attain their objectives, the president and his retainers may contrive an international crisis… almost always in foreign affairs, a sense of crisis will result in legislative deference to the president, to an enhancement of executive power, to an imperial presidency (P. 251). Therefore the Marshall Plan was created to finance the implementation of Bretton Woods and politically to eradicate the chances of a Soviet influence in Western Europe. In reaction, the Soviet Union created a Cominform to organize Communist activities. Crises increased as West Germany was being reconstructed. The Soviets applying a blockage on West access to Berlin almost provoked the declaration of between the two countries. After Truman successful airlift operations, the Soviets retreated and suspended the blockage. “The confrontation over Berlin changed the nature of the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union” (P. 46). By March of 1948, the European nations afraid of a Soviet military assault signed a defense pact in Brussels and invited the US to join them as they knew they needed its military and economic aid. NATO was signed in 1949. When Americans understood the Soviets were able to test an Atom bomb, the Truman administration had to increase its military power and established the NSC-68, to ensure American supremacy. However both sides understood the danger of an unwinnable war as both countries could be completely destroyed independently from who shoot first.
The Korean War, as Cohen described, “was the most dangerous of the wars on the periphery” (P. 256). Soviet trained Korean troops attacked Koreans troops that were trained by Americans in the south causing a turning point in Soviet-American relationship, as the Soviets did not expect the Americans to intervened (as the US had not intervened in China). However, American leaders understood that it was crucial for American supremacy that an act of aggression to be retaliated (or the inaction could result in the “domino” effect risking the US to lose its influence over all Asia). The Korean War exacerbated the fear of communism in American society, where leaders took advantage of perceived terror to gain support for their agenda, complicating even more the improvement of relations between the US and USSR. This not only resulted in conflicts that drained economic resource but also many lives in the periphery and at home (by military personal fighting wars) were lost for many years to come. These looses sparked an arms race. New American leadership called for tougher anti-Soviet agenda. Eisenhower’s “New Look” called for air and nuclear power. “The cost of conflict became unacceptably high. Aware of the dangers, leaders in both countries began to develop proposals for arms limitation (P. 88).
Kennedy’s administration goals were no different than the previous leader. Khruschev’s hoped that the new US president was going to be more respectful of Soviet policies in the Third World and at the same time send message to Washington that he wanted to reduce tensions. However, soon it was to come the gravest crises of the Cold War, the Soviet missile installation in Cuba. It was a close call for a nuclear war if the Soviets had not understood the seriousness of American retaliation. The graveness of the crises resulted in the both nations to act prudently and work towards the détente. Communication was open to engage in arms reduction agreements.
With the crises and Vietnam, American showed its resolve to fight against communism even if that implied to close its eyes for its anti-imperialism principle. US troops were engaged in the wars very far away from home, in countries which did not posed any threat to American security. “(Vietnam war) example of great-power arrogance and self-deception, of the abuse and dissipation of wealth and power” (P. 147). The 30 years war brought unprecedented misery to Vietnam and even further drained American wealth that accelerated its decline as a hegemonic power. “Defeat in Vietnam was of little consequence, without impact on the strategic balance between the US and its adversaries. Indeed before it ended, the US had taken major strides toward reconciliation with the Soviet Union and China, the very nations Americans had sought to contain by killing and dying in Vietnam” (P. 179). Conflicts resulting from the ideological war between US and USSR were fought all over the periphery in Africa, Asia, Middle East, Central Americans and Caribbean where many more lives were lost. In other to prevent the spread of communism, the US was willing to abandon its commitment to democracy and human rights and supported many totalitarian regime. “Rarely these conflicts threaten the vital interests of either the Soviet Union or the United States. The superpowers simply would not tolerate indigenous challenges to the status quo unless the challenges were likely to align with their side. With less risk of provoking a nuclear exchange, intervention was always tempting” (P. 257). All three administrations (Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon) spear no costs for their objectives regarding foreign policies causing the destabilization of the monetary system it had created. Germany and Japan came to the rescue entering the world politics once again. The power game that US and USSR play in order to attempt to control the world was coming to an end. The Soviet economy after the costs of conflicts of 60s and 70s were in deep problems and it collapse in the Mid 1980s resulting from “changes in Soviet society, Gorbachev’s reforms, modification of Soviet military doctrine and, more important, Soviet military posture.” (P. 257). The Soviet collapse meant that US could see themselves as victorious in their war against oppressive communist regime. The world was finally free from the red ink but far away from being a peaceful place. However, American impression on the world was here to stay as we see more the more the world looking “culturally” as Uncle Sam had envisioned.
In conclusion, Cohen comprehensive description of the historic context of the Cold War was informative. In my view, he is fair in demonstrating the deceits and achievements of both powers. The US is portrayed in its quest to fulfill its perceived role in leading the world according to its idealism but at the same time these principles could be distorted by the power seeking national politics that played fear games in maneuvering America public option in accordance to elite’s interests. The USSR was portray not a monsters ready to attack the west as it was the image sold to the world, however Cohen does emphasize Lenin and Stalin oppressive regimes that committed atrocities against its own people. The interplay of the two nations is presented as a reactionary game of perpetual sense of danger. Cohen makes you understand the implications of foreign policies in national politics and how the balance of power played were far away from the vision of the Founding Fathers. It is distressing to grasp the ability of the political system in working the system to advance group agendas as we know that history tends to repeat itself.
Notes:
Cohen, Warren I. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Volume IV, AMERICA in the Age of SOVIET Power, 1945-1991 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993)